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This paper examines how compensation packages change when health insurance premiums rise. We
use data on employee choices within a single large firm with a flexible benefits plan; an increasingly
common arrangement among medium and large firms. In these companies, employees explicitly
choose how to allocate compensation between cash and various benefits such as retirement, medical
insurance, life insurance, and dental benefits. We find that a $1 increase in the price of health
insurance leads to 52-cent increase in expenditures on health insurance. Approximately 2/3 of this
increase is financed through reduced wages and 1/3 through other benefits.
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Many companies have redesigned their benefits plans to require employees to pay the full 
marginal cost (pre-tax) of more expensive plans.  Such ‘fixed subsidy’ schemes have been 
discussed for over two decades (Enthoven, 1978), but have gotten more attention recently as 
health insurance premiums escalate.  These schemes are more efficient if workers have different 
tastes for health insurance (Levy, 1997), and research has shown that employee insurance 
choices are quite responsive to these arrangements (Buchmueller and Feldstein, 1996; Cutler and 
Reber, 1998). 
What is less clear is how the total compensation package—e.g. retirement benefits—
changes when health insurance premiums rise.  If the price elasticity of demand for health 
insurance is less than one — and the evidence suggests it is—then workers will increase 
expenditures on health insurance as their share of premiums rise.  But if labor supply and 
demand remains fixed, then total compensation should not change, just its composition into 
health insurance, wages, and other benefits (Smith and Ehrenberg, 1983; Summers, 1989).   This 
is easiest to see in cafeteria-style plans, where employers make a defined contribution to all 
employer-related benefits, and higher health insurance premiums must induce changes in 
composition of total compensation–either in lower after-tax wages or in decreased contributions 
to other benefits. 
This paper examines how workers change their compensation package in response to 
changing health insurance premiums.  To the extent that workers do not completely substitute 
away from rising premiums, we are particularly interested in whether employees finance health 
insurance by reducing current income (essentially wages) or other benefits (life insurance, 
disability insurance, and other benefits). 
We know of no other work in this area, although there is a substantial literature on the 
tradeoff between wages and fringe benefits. Much of this work tries to estimate the substitution 
between benefits and wages using data aggregated at the firm or industry level (Woodbury, 1983).  These estimates are somewhat limited because the fringes are often allocated as part of a 
collective bargaining agreement or a less explicit process based on worker preferences that calls 
into question the underlying assumptions of flexible wages and costless mobility (Freeman, 
1981; Goldstein and Pauly, 1976).  Others have tried to estimate the relationship with employee-
level data from multiple firms.  The implausible result that wages and benefits do not tradeoff—
holding productivity fixed—are best explained as bias due to unobserved heterogeneity (Smith & 
Ehrenberg, 1983). 
We try to avoid these problems by focusing on employee choices within a single large 
firm with a flexible benefits plan. Under such an arrangement, employees explicitly choose how 
to allocate compensation between cash and various benefits, such as retirement, medical 
insurance, life insurance, and dental benefits.  Such plans cover 52% of workers in medium and 
large firms, and the proportion is growing, so they are interesting to study in their own right 
(BLS, 1999).  The effect of health insurance premiums on compensation is identified by the 
substantial variation in premiums across years. 
The results suggest that about two-thirds of the premium increase is financed out of cash 
wages and the remaining one-thirds is financed by a reduction in benefits. However, these 
findings come from only a single firm—and hence limit our ability to draw inferences to the 
general population—but they do suggest that the relationship between health insurance benefits, 
and wages warrants further investigation. 
 
DATA 
The original data set consists of three years (1989-1991) of earnings and benefit 
information for employees under age 65 at a single U.S. company.1  While these data are 10 
years old, this period is relevant to the current debate about health care costs because health 
insurance premiums are rising rapidly today, as they were in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.  It 
                                                 
1These data were obtained from a benefits consulting firm. The terms of the data release 
precluded us from providing detail about the company, including its industry.   also is comparable to periods studied in other research looking at health plan switching that 
found large elasticities.  Furthermore, there is little reason to expect that human behavior with 
regard to insurance choice has changed much over the last decade. Our study focuses on a 
sample of single employees who signed up for a health insurance plan2. Families are excluded 
because we have no information on the health insurance opportunity sets of spouses, and how 
those might change over time. These employees are geographically dispersed across 47 states.  
The data also include a limited set of demographic controls such as age and sex.  Since we 
analyze changes in employees’ expenditures relative to the previous years, we restrict our 
attention to employees with atleast two years of data – resulting in an analysis sample of 7,896 
employee-year observations. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample.  Total compensation averaged 
$27,412.  Approximately 2.3% of compensation ($622) went towards the purchase of health 
insurance, 1.1% ($286) went towards purchase of other benefits within the cafeteria plan and the 
remaining compensation was taken as wages.  Benefits appear low as a fraction of total 
compensation because our benefits and compensation measures do not include legally mandated 
benefits such as Social Security and workers’ compensation, nor do they include the employer 
contributions towards health insurance and retirement. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Employees in this firm were given a menu of benefit options. To finance these benefits 
each employee was also given a completely fungible credit allocation that depends on salary and 
job tenure. However, the credit allocation does not determine expenses on benefits as employees 
can make additional pre-tax deductions from their salaries or wages to finance benefits. In 
addition, employees can also choose to cash –out most of their credit allocation.  
 [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
                                                 
2 We excluded a small number of single employees (222) who did enroll in the employers health 
plan despite a free catastrophic health plan option. Clearly these employees had other outside insurance 
options . Table 2 shows the mean, standard deviation and probability of contributing, for each 
benefit component of total compensation in 1990.   Employees spend their total compensation on 
wages, health insurance, dental insurance, life insurance, disability insurance, health care savings 
account,3 retirement plan, accident insurance, survivor insurance, and life insurance to cover 
dependents.  Some of these components are rarely used, and the contributions are small.  Rather 
than estimate models for all of them, we aggregate these into three broad categories – wage, 
health insurance and other benefits. Although the benefits in the “other benefits” category are 
diverse they are conceptually related in that most of them are insurance products that involve 
forgoing current consumption (in terms of premiums) for future and uncertain payouts.  
Table 3 shows the enrollment in each year for the different health insurance plans offered 
by the firm. The company offers two types of health insurance plans: fee-for-service (FFS) plans 
and HMOs. Table 3 shows that within the FFS class, there are three types of plans: a catastrophic 
plan with a deductible of 5% of salary, a low option plan with deductibles of $300 for 
individuals, and a high option with deductibles of $150.  The other plans consist of 43 HMOs 
nationwide, with each employee’s available options depending on state of residence and year.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
As with most employers, this company contributes towards the purchase of these plans.  
Unlike many employers, however, the amount does not vary by plan choice, but depends only on 
the number of beneficiaries.  By not contributing more generously to more expensive plans, the 
employer makes employees face the full marginal cost of more generous coverage (on a pre-tax 
basis).  The employer’s ‘fixed subsidy’ is equal to the premium for the catastrophic plan. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Table 4 shows the variation in the copremiums—the amount of total premium paid by the 
employee—across plans.  HMO copremiums rose faster in absolute and percentage terms from 
                                                 
3An employee can deposit funds free of income taxes in a health care savings account to 
reimburse qualifying health care expenses. Any unused funds left in the account at the end of the year are 
forfeited.  1989 to 1990.  From 1990 to 1991, the premiums in the low-deductible FFS plan rose faster than 
the HMO premiums, but the HMO premiums still increased substantially.  The drop in 
enrollment in both types of plans (shown in Table 3) during that period may reflect these 
premium increases.  Table 4 also shows that HMO premiums vary considerably over this period, 
sometimes falling as much as 26% or increasing by 34% year-to-year.  We exploit this 
considerable variation to identify our models. 
 METHODS 
We model how the allocation of total compensation varies with an increase in costs of 
health insurance for employees.  That is, we want to know the responsiveness of each component 
of total compensation (wages, health insurance expenditures, other benefits) to changes in health 
insurance prices for employees.  The key challenge is to measure changes in the price of health 
insurance for employees.  
Ideally, a measure of increase in the price of health insurance would show the difference 
in the costs of obtaining a reference level of utility due to a new vector of health insurance 
copremiums. However, the problem with constructing this “true price index” is that utility is not 
measurable. To circumvent this problem alternative estimates of price changes calculate the 
difference in costs of obtaining a fixed basket of goods at a new vector of prices. Two well-
known indices are the Laspeyres price index that measures the difference in costs of purchasing 
the base year basket of goods and the Paasche price index that measures the difference in costs of 
purchasing the current year basket of goods. Although these fixed weight indices are easy to 
calculate they induce some bias in the measurement of cost changes. Most importantly, these 
indices ignore the possibility of substitution among goods due to changes in relative prices. For 
example, employees might switch to cheaper health plans in response to changes in the relative 
price of health plans (This is true in our data as shown in Tables 3 and 4). Thus using base year 
enrollment in different health plans as weights for the price index will overstate the true increase 
in the cost of health insurance. Fisher (1922) proposed an index that is the geometric mean of the 
Laspeyres and Paasche price index. The Fisher price index has much lower substitution bias and 
other desirable properties compared to other fixed weight price indices (Diewert, 1976).  In 
particular it closely approximates the true cost index if preferences are homothetic. Due to its 
desirable properties most statistical agencies around the world including the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis at the US Commerce Department have started using the Fisher index to measure changes in prices and quantities (Boskin et al., 1998). We also use the Fisher price index to 
measure changes in prices.  
Since HMO plan options and copremiums vary with the state we create separate indices 
for each state in our data.  If the vector  ( ) ,1 , , 2 , , , , , , , ,.., ,.., s ts t s t j s t J s PP P P P =
)
t  represent the insurance 
copremiums for each of the J health plans offered in each state s in year t and the vector 
( ,1 , , 2 , , , , , , , ,.., ,.., s ts t s t j s t J s QQ Q Q Q = t represents the percentage of employees enrolled in each of 
the J health plans in state s in year t, then the Fisher index for state s in year t is defined as4: 
(1) 
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Finally we create a price of insurance variable for each state s in year t ( , s t price ) by 
multiplying the Fisher index for each state-year with the average copremiums in that state in 
1989. This essentially rescales the unit-less Fisher index to 1989 copremium dollars in each state 
and thus makes our regressions results easy to interpret.   






We estimate separate employee fixed-effects models for each component of total 
compensation. Essentially, an employee fixed-effects model controls for employee-specific time 
invariant unobservables (such as preferences for insurance) and primarily uses variation in 
employee choices and prices overtime to identify parameter estimates. Models that ignore these 
fixed effects will produce biased estimates if the employee-specific unobservables are correlated 
with our explanatory variables. If  i and t subscript the employee and year then our empirical 
model can be summarized by the following equations: 
(3)    ,,
wage wage wage wage
it i it it it Wage Price X αδ β ε =+ + +
(4)    ,,
benefit benefit benefit benefit
it i it it it Benefit Price X αδ β ε =+ + +
(5)    ,,  
health health health health
it i it it it Health Insurance Price X αδ β ε =+ + +
(6)  ,, , ,    it it it it Total Compensation Wage Benefit Health Insurance i t = ++ ∀
                                                
 
 
4 1989 is the base year and 1991 is the current year Where, 
k α  represents the employee fixed effects for benefit k, 
k δ measures the increase 
in expenditures on wage or benefit k due to a one dollar increase in the price of health insurance, 
and similarly the vector
k β measures the changes in benefit k due to changes in other covariates X 
in our model. Equations (6) is an accounting identity and states that expenditures on wages, 
health insurance and other benefits add up to the total compensation of the employee. Equation 
(6) along with the three behavioral equation (3), (4) and (5) also implies that  . That is, 
given that total compensation is fixed, any change in health insurance expenditures due to rising 





To better illustrate our results we also compute the expenditure elasticity of each benefit 










ξ =   
Where, 
k ξ  measures the percentage change in expenditures on benefit k due to a one 
percent change in the price of health insurance, 
k δ  is the parameter estimate from equations (3) 
to (5),  89 P  is the mean health insurance price in 1989 and  89
k E is the mean expenditure on benefit 
k in 1989.   
RESULTS 
The parameter estimates from models (3) to (5) are presented in the Table 5.  The results 
show that a $1 increase in the price of health insurance leads to a 52 cents increase in health 
insurance expenditures. This 52 cent increase in health insurance expenditures is financed by a 
37 cents reduction in take home wages and a 15 cents reduction in other benefits. Thus 
approximately 70% of the increase in health insurance expenditures due increase in prices is 
financed by wage reductions. Put in elasticity terms, each 100% increase in the price of health 
insurance leads to a 50% increase in health insurance expenditures, a 1% decrease in take home 
wages, and a 28% decrease in other benefits. DISCUSSION 
Our results suggest that employees facing an increase in the price of health insurance 
respond by lowering their level of insurance coverage. However, employees do not completely 
substitute away from health insurance, in fact increases in prices lead to increases in health 
insurance expenditures. These results accord well with the previous literature, which also found 
that the price elasticity of demand for health insurance was less than 1 (Buchmueller and 
Feldstein, 1996; Cutler and Reber, 1998).  
Increases in expenditures on health insurance are accommodated by reducing both the 
take-home income and other benefits such as life insurance, disability insurance, dental insurance 
and retirement benefits. Thus, our results suggest that rising health insurance prices not only 
reduce resources for current consumption but also lower insurance purchases against a variety of 
risks. If health insurance prices continue to rise and individuals continue to reduce their purchase 
of health insurance and other insurance products that might leave them vulnerable to health, 
mortality, disability and other significant risks in the long run.    
 Our results also show that when employees are given the choice of absorbing premium 
increases through salary reductions or limiting expenditures on health and other benefits, they 
primarily choose to reduce take-home pay.  This choice might reflect the advantage to employees 
of retaining non-taxed compensation in the form of benefits, and instead reducing taxable 
income.  This suggests, that employers who trade off wage increases for increases in health 
insurance premiums are reallocating compensation in a way that workers have shown they prefer 
when they are provided options within flexible spending plans. 
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(N=7,896 employee-years) 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Age 35.1 10.8 18  64
Tenure (years)  6.1 6.5 0  44
Female 0.70 0.45 0  1
Health Insurance Benefit
a   $622.7 $235.9 0  $1,428
Other Fringe Benefits
a   $285.8 $279.8 0  $5,335
Net Wages
a   $26,503.5 $11,581.9 $6,593  $109,303
Total Compensation
a,b   $27,412.0 $11,732.6 $7,277  $110,994
Notes
 
aAll amounts are in 1989 constant dollars. 
 bTotal compensation includes wages, health insurance and other benefits. 
 
  
Table 2.  Employee Expenditures on Benefits in 1990 
 
(N=2,934) 




Mean  Std Dev 
% Making 
Contribution
Components of Total Compensation     
  Health Insurance  633 221 100 
  Other Benefits  289 267  94 
       Life Insurance  38  116  34 
       Long-Term Disability  70  66  72 
        Accident Insurance  13  21  50 
        Dependent Life Insurance  1  1  1 
        Survivor Insurance  0  0  0 
        Retirement  11  58  6 
        Health Care Expense Acct  33  165  7 
        Dental Insurance  123  71  76 
  Wages      26,289  11,451  100 
            Notes 
       All amounts are in 1989 constant dollars. 
            Total compensation includes wages, health insurance and other benefits. 
  
Table 3.  Employee Insurance Choices, 1989 to 1991 
 
    Percent Choosing Plan In: 
Plan Type  Deductible  1989  1990  1991 
FFS    
  Catastrophic  5% of salary  6.1  8.8  15.0 
  High Deductible  $300  8.5  10.0  13.6 
  Low Deductible  $150  42.6  39.3  34.0 
HMO* 42.8  41.9  37.4 
    
Number of Employees  2,545  2,934  2,417 
 
Notes 
* There are 43 different HMOs offered—we do not break out enrollment 














(% Increase 89-90) 
Co-Premium, 1991
b,c 
(% Increase 90-91) 
FFS/5% of Salary  1  0  0  0 














  $489 to $946  $455 to $1,110 
(-26% to 34%) 
$549 to $1,428 
(-6% to 29%) 
 
Notes 
a The last row in this column shows the range of copremium and percent increase from 
previous years for the HMO plans. 
bThe HMO copremium for each employee-year observation is calculated as the average 
copremium for enrolling in an HMO in that year for the employees state of residence. The 
HMO copremium reported is average copremium across all employees.   
cAll copremiums  are in 1989 constant dollars 
 Table 5. Employee Fixed-Effect Model of Increase in Health Insurance Price on Allocation of 
Total Compensation 
 Wages  Other  Benefits 
Variable  Coefficient  Std Error  t-statistic  Coefficient  Std Error  t-statistic 
Price  -0.3658 0.1205 -3.04 -0.1513 0.0815 -1.86
Age  -16.9709 30.2048 -0.56 108.8262 20.4346 5.33
Age  Square  0.0568 0.1602 0.36 -0.9466 0.1084 -8.73
Tenure  49.0654 26.2687 1.84 -64.4919 18.0625 -3.57
Total  Compensation  0.9870 0.0023 413.22 0.0074 0.0016 4.61
Intercept  -97.6600 797.7172 -0.12 -1,963.9660 539.6825 -3.64
  Health Insurance Expenditures      
Variable Coefficient  Std  Error  t-statistic      
Price 0.5171  0.0827 6.25     
Age -91.8554  20.7380 -4.43     
Age Square  0.8897  0.1100 8.09     
Tenure 15.4264  18.3307 0.84     
Total Compensation  0.0055  0.0016 3.36     
Intercept 2061.6290  547.6962 3.76     
 Expenditure  Elasticity      
  Coefficient Std  Error  t-statistic      
Wages -0.0083  0.0027 -3.04     
Other Benefits  -0.2870  0.1543 -1.86     
Health Insurance  0.5136  0.0821 6.25     
 
 